“Lithuanian history is defined by sacrifice,” stresses Laurynas Vaičiūnas. That legacy, he argues, explains why Vilnius rejects half-measures in the face of Russian aggression and why its path often diverges from Hungary’s. In this interview, Vaičiūnas also weighs in on Lithuania’s demographic struggles, immigration dilemmas, and its role on Europe’s edge.
How do you see Hungary from a Lithuanian point of view? Let’s start with the Hungarian government.
From a Lithuanian perspective—the mainstream one—the Hungarian government is seen as a troublemaker. It’s viewed as a country that undermines the unity of the European Union, openly collaborating with an aggressor state. Some Lithuanians might accept the argument that Hungary is simply trying to balance its politics and find its own path as a unique country. However, Lithuania is also a small, exceptional country: our language is spoken by only about 3.5 million people, and throughout history we have always had to survive surrounded by Slavic nations—Hungary being somewhat of an exception. For us, Hungary’s current policy of cooperating with a country that has caused immense destruction in Europe—and killed thousands of Lithuanians in the 20th century—is very painful to accept. That’s simply the reality.
Let’s, we can move on to Hungary in general.
Economically, there’s little to counterbalance this perception. Bilateral ties are not extensive. Historically, however, Hungary was often seen in a positive light: Hungarian music under communism, and especially the 1956 revolution, left a strong impression on the older generation. Everyone in Lithuania appreciates Budapest, just as in many other European countries. However, this cultural admiration doesn’t align with the current political perception. The spirit of 1956—resisting Moscow and standing up for freedom—is not compatible with today’s balancing act between democracy and authoritarianism.
You mentioned the 1956 revolution, which was the only bloody uprising against the Soviet Union during the 20th century. Many Hungarians feel that back then they were encouraged to rise up for freedom, but due to the Suez Crisis, the West abandoned them. Some argue that this legacy explains today’s tendency toward caution as they say: “We support Ukraine, but not with weapons. We support freedom but also call for a ceasefire to end the war, to save lives, to stop the destruction of Ukrainian cities.” From a Hungarian standpoint, pushing Moscow back too hard—like the Baltic states advocate—might only escalate the war further. What is your opinion on this mindset?
It’s not compatible. Lithuania is in a completely different geographic position—Belarus is only 30 kilometres from Vilnius; our security reality can never be equated with Hungary’s. Secondly, when it comes to national histories, our perspectives differ profoundly. Lithuanian history is defined by sacrifice: resistance fighters in the forests, people defending statehood built in the interwar years, tens of thousands deported to Siberia. That legacy shapes our current resilience, so when Hungarians argue for compromise or weighing lives against principles, it clashes with our own narrative – we will probably never agree on this. On the issue of ceasefire: from our point of view, Hungary sometimes goes beyond neutrality—it occasionally seems to support tendencies that risk Ukraine’s disintegration. This leaves a bad aftertaste. Of course, we understand Hungary’s concern for ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine and its trauma over the Treaty of Trianon but creating instability around Ukraine is never beneficial. Economically, Hungary used to be much wealthier than Lithuania. Now, Lithuania has overtaken Hungary in terms of purchasing power and European average wages. That makes Lithuanians more confident in believing that our approach, not Hungary’s, is the right one.
As a small country, it’s often easier to adapt—like Slovenia or Estonia—compared to medium-sized countries such as Hungary that not as large as Poland with their significant internal markets. Let’s leave aside Russia and Hungary. What about Lithuania’s own future? How do you see the country in three or four decades?
Unfortunately, Lithuania will remain a frontline state. Whether we like it or not, new geopolitical blocs are forming, and Lithuania is right on the edge. Just like in the Middle Ages, people avoided living near frontiers; the same risk exists today. Demographics are a challenge—low birth rates, resistance to immigration, that won’t change quickly. Still, Lithuania will remain a modern, open economy. Today’s generation is happy with its life—according to surveys and happiness indices—and that energy will continue, Lithuania will likely be smaller in population, more efficient, and more automated.
You mentioned immigration. Could immigrants from Ukraine or Belarus become part of Lithuania’s future?
One of the biggest challenges is the Russian language, which Lithuanians associate with imperial occupation. People here don’t want to hear it again in their daily lives. Lithuania also lacks strong integration strategies—Poland has done somewhat better, though even there we see a backlash. For Lithuania, the real challenge is to integrate newcomers into the Lithuanian spirit and identity, without that, immigration isn’t a long-term solution. In the end, Lithuania is not unique—like much of Europe, it faces growing resistance to immigration.
Laurynas Vaičiūnas is a historian and political scientist with a focus on the politics, society, and culture of the Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. He serves as chairman of the College of Eastern Europe and is widely engaged in analysing regional security, identity, and historical memory in Central and Eastern Europe.