Now that the passions stirred up after the Davos summit have subsided, it is worth examining the United States’ ambitions regarding Greenland with a cool head. America’s interest in the world’s largest island is far from groundless: it is underpinned both by its historical presence and defensive role, as well as by today’s geopolitical realities. In light of China’s and Russia’s steadily growing Arctic influence, and Europe’s hesitant crisis management, the question arises: who else would defend the critically important areas of the transatlantic space, if not America?
America’s Decades-Long Presence on the Island
America recognised Greenland's strategic importance during the Second World War. In the spring of 1941, Henrik Kauffmann, the Danish ambassador to Washington – acting without authorisation from the occupied government in Copenhagen – signed a defence agreement that granted the U.S. military broad access to the island to curb Nazi expansion and support the European theatre of war. The United States effectively took over Greenland’s defence: within a few years, it built a network of bases with garrisons numbering in the thousands, and by 1944, American soldiers made up roughly one quarter of the island’s population. After the war, Washington considered Greenland so crucial that in 1946 it attempted to purchase it for 100 million dollars – an offer Denmark ultimately rejected.
In the early phase of the Cold War, following World War II, Greenland once again became a key element of Western defence due to the Soviet nuclear threat. Denmark’s economic and military capabilities did not allow it to secure the island’s defence on its own, so in 1951 a new defence agreement was concluded between Copenhagen and Washington – an agreement that, incidentally, remains in force to this day. This led to the establishment of the Thule Air Base in the Arctic, signalling that Greenland had become an indispensable link in the North Atlantic security chain. During the Cold War, the Thule base was a crucial component of transatlantic defence, protecting the coasts of North America and Europe through American technological superiority. At its peak, more than 10,000 American soldiers were stationed there, clearly demonstrating the scale of Washington’s commitment to Arctic security. Moreover, U.S. military engineers even ventured beneath the ice sheet: the experimental Camp Century base was built within the Greenland ice sheet, complete with a nuclear reactor, signalling that the Pentagon was capable of establishing a foothold anywhere in the Arctic as well.
Thus, for decades, the United States served as Greenland’s de facto protecting power – stepping in whenever Europe or Denmark was unable to care for the island. This peculiar form of “substitute sovereignty” is still perceptible today, as the American presence (albeit on a smaller scale than during the Cold War) has never disappeared from the island.
Strategic Value and Great Power Competition
In recent years, American leadership has once again emphasised its interest in Greenland. In 2019, Donald Trump openly raised the idea of purchasing the island – an idea angrily rejected by Copenhagen and Nuuk – and then, in December 2024, now as president-elect, Trump described Greenland’s acquisition by the United States as an “absolute necessity” from the perspective of national security and global freedom. What explains this persistent interest?
In short: Greenland’s geopolitical position and its resources. The island lies halfway between North America and Europe and spans a vast territory, making it an ideal forward outpost in the Northern Hemisphere. In addition, it is rich in mineral resources – rare earth elements and metal ores – and may also possess significant (still untapped) oil and gas reserves. It is no coincidence that experts believe these factors – above all, the strategically vital rare earth elements – lie behind American plans. During the Cold War, the threat came from the Soviet Union; today, both Russia and China are seeking to expand their presence in the Arctic. Moscow is increasing its military footprint in the region (one need only think of its fleet bases and submarines), while Beijing is attempting to establish a foothold as a “near-Arctic state.” Chinese state-owned companies have tried to enter Greenland through investments – for example, airport construction and mining projects – which Western allies have watched with suspicion. For the United States, all of this serves as a warning: it cannot afford to hand over this piece of land, which represents the northern gateway to the Atlantic Ocean, to its rivals.
Europe’s Limits and the American Guarantee
The European members of the Western alliance would hardly be able to guarantee Greenland’s security on their own. Denmark’s military power pales in comparison to that of the United States; the island does not even have its own army, and its defence is ensured by the Danish armed forces (in practice, NATO, and within it primarily the United States). The war that broke out in Ukraine in 2022 already demonstrated how heavily Europe depends on American military assistance. In the first months of the conflict, Western EU member states proved incapable of acting quickly and in a coordinated manner; ultimately, it was under American pressure and leadership that substantial arms deliveries began – clearly illustrating the continent’s defensive shortcomings. Without Washington’s intelligence, logistical, and arms-supply contributions, EU countries would struggle even in their immediate neighbourhood – let alone in one of the world’s most remote and inhospitable regions. Consequently, the United States remains the primary guarantor of transatlantic security, especially in critically important areas such as the North Atlantic region and Greenland.
Conclusion: Reality and Vision for the Future
Although Greenland is legally part of the Kingdom of Denmark and its inhabitants are entitled to the right of self-determination, the geopolitical reality is that only the United States can guarantee the region’s security. Greenland’s 2009 Self-Government Act stipulates that Greenlanders must decide any change in sovereignty; consequently, any attempt to assert American claims can occur only with their consent. Copenhagen and Nuuk have made this unequivocally clear: “Greenland is not for sale, and it never will be,” as stated both by Múte Egede and later by his successor, Greenlandic Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen. Incidentally, the United States has not shied away from territorial purchases in the past either: it acquired Alaska from Russia in 1867, and the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917 – yet Greenland’s case goes far beyond a simple transaction. At the same time, an increase in the American presence does not necessarily imply “annexation” in the traditional sense. For Washington, the most plausible scenario would be closer defence and economic cooperation, possibly a special association agreement (modelled on the Pacific free association compacts), through which Greenland could become a de facto reinforced pillar of the American sphere of interest.
Overall, then, the United States’ claim regarding Greenland is indeed well-founded and realistic – if not in the form of classic colonisation, then as an expression of the need to maintain Western security. America has already proven that it is willing and able to defend the island when others could not; and in the future it will remain a key actor in shaping Greenland’s fate – because the harsh logic of world politics dictates as much. After the Davos debate has died down, it is time to look at this issue realistically: without the United States, Greenland’s security – and with it that of the transatlantic region – would be nothing more than an illusion. American involvement, therefore, represents not a threat but a guarantee that Greenland and its surroundings will not become prey to Eastern powers (Russia or China).